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The OECD Principles of Corporate
Governance*
Introduction
T
he integrity of businesses and markets is central to the vitality and stability of
our economies. So good corporate governance - the rules and practices that
govern the relationship between the managers and shareholders of corporations,
as well as stakeholders like employees and creditors - contributes to growth and
financial stability by underpinning market confidence, financial market integrity
and economic efficiency. Recent corporate scandals have focussed the minds of
governments, regulators, companies, investors and the general public on weaknesses
in corporate governance systems and the need to address this issue.
The  OECD Principles of Corporate Governance provide specific guidance for
policymakers, regulators and market participants in improving the legal, institutional
and regulatory framework that underpins corporate governance, with a focus on
publicly traded companies. They also provide practical suggestions for stock
exchanges, investors, corporations and other parties that have a role in the process
of developing good corporate governance. They have been endorsed as one of the
Financial Stability Forum’s 12 key standards essential for financial stability.
The OECD Principles were originally issued in 1999 and have since become the
international benchmark for corporate governance, forming the basis for a number
of reform initiatives, both by governments and the private sector. The Principles
were revised in 2003 to take into account developments since 1999, through a
process of extensive and open consultations, and drawing on the work of the Re-
gional Corporate Governance Roundtables for non-OECD countries. The new
* Originally published by the OECD in English and French under the titles:
Policy Brief: The OECD Principles of Corporate Governance, © OECD 2004. All rights reserved.
Synthèses: Les principes de gouvernement d’entreprise à l’OCDE, ©  OECD 2004. All rights reserved.184
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Principles were agreed by OECD governments in April 2004. This Policy Brief
outlines the salient features of the Principles and illustrates how they address key
corporate governance issues.
What are the Principles  and what issues do they address?
The  Principles  cover six key areas of corporate governance - ensuring the
basis for an effective corporate governance framework; the rights of shareholders;
the equitable treatment of shareholders; the role of stakeholders in corporate
governance; disclosure and transparency; and the responsibilities of the board
(see Box 1). There are explanatory annotations for each area that also indicate
the range of policy measures which have proved useful in achieving them. Key
to the success of the Principles  is that they are principles-based and non-
prescriptive so that they retain their relevance in varying legal, economic and
social contexts.The OECD Principles of Corporate Governance
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Box 1. The main areas of the OECD Principles
I. Ensuring the basis for an effective corporate governance framework
The corporate governance framework should promote transparent and efficient
markets, be consistent with the rule of law and clearly articulate the division
of responsibilities among different supervisory, regulatory and enforcement
authorities.
II. The rights of shareholders and key ownership functions
The corporate governance framework should protect and facilitate the exercise
of shareholders’ rights.
III. The equitable treatment of shareholders
The corporate governance framework should ensure the equitable treatment of
all shareholders, including minority and foreign shareholders. All shareholders
should have the opportunity to obtain effective redress for violation of their
rights.
IV. The role of stakeholders in corporate governance
The corporate governance framework should recognise the rights of stakeholders
established by law or through mutual agreements and encourage active co-
operation between corporations and stakeholders in creating wealth, jobs, and
the sustainability of financially sound enterprises.
V. Disclosure and transparency
The corporate governance framework should ensure that timely and accurate
disclosure is made on all material matters regarding the corporation, including
the financial situation, performance, ownership, and governance of the company.
VI. The responsibilities of the board
The corporate governance framework should ensure the strategic guidance of
the company, the effective monitoring of management by the board, and the
board’s accountability to the company and the shareholders.186
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The basic requirements of the institutional and legal/regulatory framework
needed to support effective corporate governance are an integral part of the
Principles. The text includes principles for developing such a framework and
addresses the need for laws and regulations which are both enforceable and
are backed by effective enforcement agencies. Experience around the world
shows that although the powerful concept of a listed company has been
successfully introduced in many countries, the accompanying legal and
regulatory system has often lagged, leading in some cases to abuse of minority
shareholders and to reduced growth prospects when financial markets lose
credibility - or fail to achieve it in the first place.
Other areas covered by the Principles are aimed at establishing an effective system
of checks and balances between boards and management. Professional mana-
gers, for example, have a key role to play in the modern listed or widely-held
company, but to avoid possible misuse of their position requires, inter alia, effective
monitoring by the board. The Principles stress that such monitoring should not
involve day-today management but rather ensure strategic guidance of the company
and the oversight of internal controls.
But who monitors the monitors? The board in turn is accountable to shareholders
who, the Principles maintain, should be able to exercise their fundamental ownership
rights, including appointing and removing board members, and should be treated
equitably by the company. Effective use of ownership rights to monitor and influence
the board requires basic standards of disclosure and transparency, another area
which is considered. Reality is, however, often more complex with companies and
their management controlled by a dominant shareholder - a somewhat different
case for monitoring, but one that is also covered by the Principles. Finally, if the
enterprise is to be successful, the board will also have to consider stakeholders
such as employees and creditors who supply the firm with resources and who also
need access to timely and relevant information. Attention to stakeholders is a unique
feature of the Principles.
The OECD Principles are highly relevant to a number of recent high-profile ca-
ses of corporate failure. For example, in a number of cases, boards appear to have
been dormant or even to have become a part of management, rather than an active
monitor of its performance. In other cases, boards appear to act simply as rubber
stamps, responding to the wishes of a dominant shareholder. Shareholders appear
to have been either passive or ineffective at sanctioning the board and in a numberThe OECD Principles of Corporate Governance
187  No. 216, mayo-agosto 2005
of cases controlling shareholders have pursued their interests at the expense of
minority shareholders. Complex financial institutions and complex corporate
structures around the world have also thrown into stark relief the question of
conflicts of interest, which have been most apparent in some brokerage research
and in fund management. The Principles have always addressed these issues, but
the revised version gives them more emphasis.
How to strengthen the ownership role of shareholders?
The significant increase in the shareholdings of institutional investors in many
countries in recent years is often thought to have led to the formation of a large and
powerful constituency in favour of monitoring companies. In fact, institutional
investors, especially those acting in a fiduciary role such as collective investment
schemes and pension funds, continue to play a limited role in corporate governance
as owners of companies. The central policy issue is not necessarily whether they
should have additional rights as shareholders, but rather that they do not make
informed use of rights they already have. This is of course to the detriment of the
investor who has entrusted funds to these institutions. The general approach taken
by the Principles is that the decision to exercise voting rights in an informed manner
is related to both the costs and benefits of voting, so in many instances it is the
incentive to vote which needs to be improved, in part through policy initiatives. The
Principles do not oblige institutional investors acting in a fiduciary capacity to vote
their shares, but they do call on them to disclose their voting policies. When these
policies include active use of ownership rights, the Principles also recommend
that institutional investors disclose how they implement these policies, including the
resources they set aside for this purpose. The Principles also call for impediments
to cross-border voting to be eliminated and for companies to avoid making it unduly
difficult or expensive to vote.
With respect to exercising ownership rights, the Principles  advocate that
shareholders should have the right to remove board members and to participate in
nominating them. Shareholders should be able to ask questions of the board at the
general meeting and to place items on the agenda. The Principles  call for the
board to formulate and disclose a remuneration policy for board members and key
executives, highlighting the link between remuneration and performance.
Shareholders should be able to make their views known about this policy and any
equity component, such as share options, should be subject to their approval.188
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Even for institutional investors, the informed use of ownership rights is costly. In
many instances, institutional investors feel that their stakes in individual companies
are not large enough to justify these costs. To overcome this situation, the Principles
recommend that the authorities allow or even encourage institutions (and other
shareholders) to co-operate and coordinate their actions. However, there is an
important caveat that such co-operation is not aimed at manipulating the market or
obtaining control of the company without going through accepted takeover
procedures. Better co-ordination in nominating and electing board members, placing
proposals on the agenda and holding discussions directly with a company are all
welcome as valid methods of improving corporate governance. Overall, the
Principles take the view that the costs of effective ownership can and should be
reduced.
As part of its approach to participation by institutional investors, the Principles call
on countries to lift unnecessary regulatory barriers to a continuing dialogue between
investors and companies. At the same time, recognising that such close relations
can degenerate into abuses, particularly in situations where there are inherent
conflicts of interest, the Principles  recommend that general disclosure of
information to the market should remain the practice. Any additional information
released by a company to institutional investors should be aimed at helping them
understand the background to such published information.
How do the Principles  deal with conflicts of interest?
One of the most striking lessons of recent years is that conflicts of interest are
widespread and can often lead to behaviour detrimental to shareholders, investors
and stakeholders. Since conflicts of interest take many different forms they are
dealt with in several different sections of the Principles. As a general approach,
the  Principles  advocate both full disclosure and an explanation by the parties
involved as to how the conflict of interest is being managed.
Managing conflicts of interest is particularly important with respect to external
auditors, whose independence is crucial for financial market integrity. The Principles
support the Principles of Auditor Oversight issued by the International Organisation
of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) in 2002. These recommend creating a body,
acting in the public interest, to provide oversight of the quality and implementation
of audits. The OECD Principles recognise the importance of recent provisionsThe OECD Principles of Corporate Governance
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introduced by many countries to deal with the skewed incentive structure that
arises when the external auditor provides non-audit services or when he might be
involved in auditing his own work. Managing the relationship with the external
auditor so as to ensure a high-quality independent audit is also identified by the
Principles as a key duty of the board.
An effective corporate governance framework needs to be backed by effective
ways to ensure the integrity of those such as financial analysts, brokers and rating
agencies that provide information or advice which could influence investors’
decisions. This is necessary since close relationships between service providers
and their client companies introduce the potential for conflict of interests.
It is important for the market to know whether the company is run with due regard
to the interests of all its investors. To this end, the Principles state that it is essential
for the company to fully disclose any material related-party transactions. Such
transactions are typically between the company and entities in which it or its
management have an interest, or with significant shareholders, including their close
relatives and associates. The Principles call for the beneficiary of such a transaction
to be obliged to inform the board, which in turn should make a disclosure to the
market.  This should not, however, absolve the firm from maintaining its own
monitoring.
The Principles emphasise the need to protect minority shareholders, most notably
where there are controlling shareholders whose interests might diverge from those
of the others. This is particularly a source of concern in jurisdictions where the
legal and regulatory framework for minority protection is weak. The Principles
reaffirm that it is reasonable for investors to expect that the abuse of insider power,
including by controlling shareholders, will be prohibited. In cases where such abu-
ses are not specifically forbidden by legislation or where enforcement is not effective,
the Principles call on policymakers to consider measures to fill such gaps.
How do the Principles  help strengthen company oversight by boards?
The company board serves as the fulcrum that balances the ownership rights
enjoyed by shareholders with the discretion granted to managers. Good corporate
governance requires that the board, whatever its structure, focus on long-term
issues, such as assessing corporate strategy, and activities that might involve a190
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change in the nature and direction of the company, rather than taking on day-to-
day operational responsibilities. However, boards as a whole and their individual
members must have clearly-defined incentives and duties to ensure that the board
effectively exercises its functions.
The Principles specify clearly-defined responsibilities for the board that include
establishing a code of corporate ethics, ensuring compliance with laws and
standards, and oversight of internal control systems for financial  reporting. The
board should also be responsible for formulating and disclosing a remuneration
policy that highlights the link between remuneration and performance for key
executives and board members. Many countries now regard as best practice the
creation of a remuneration committee with independent directors.
Since the board and its members have a fiduciary duty to the company and all its
shareholders, the Principles embrace a general notion of board independence and
objectivity, rather than referring simply to independence from management. When
a company is part of a group, the board’s duty is to the company, not the group.
Boards should review related party transactions using independent board mem-
bers and provide confidential access for whistle-blowers who may be in a position
to identify unethical conduct and abusive transactions. Although board committees
for tasks such as audit, remuneration and nomination have spread in the past few
years, the underlying concepts are not always well understood and committees
often serve quite different roles in different companies. To avoid confusion and to
inform investors, the Principles advocate that the composition, mandate and remit
of committees be clearly defined and fully disclosed.
How can governments use the Principles?
Although a number of features advocated by the Principles require action by
boards, investors and others, there is also an important role for governments to
play. For example, boards will usually be able to adopt a structure consistent
with effective supervision of management and effective accountability to
shareholders. However, desirable features such as cooperation between
investors and protection of minority shareholders may depend to a great extent
on government action to remove regulatory barriers and to enforce rights. In
addition, private actions alone might not lead to desirable corporate governance
practices. Where management is entrenched and capital markets are weak,The OECD Principles of Corporate Governance
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for example, boards may continue to avoid their responsibilities unless the authorities
take remedial action.
The Principles offer broad guidance for governments to follow when reviewing
whether their corporate governance framework is compatible with establishing the
corporate governance they want. Policymakers are encouraged to develop the
governance framework with a view to its impact on overall economic   performan-
ce,   market   integrity and the incentives it creates for market participants and the
promotion of transparent and efficient markets. This should help reduce the risk of
costly over-regulation and minimise the unintended consequences of policy measures.
To underpin market integrity, the legal and regulatory requirements that affect
corporate governance practices should be consistent with the rule of law, transparent
and enforceable.
The Principles also cover the types of mechanisms that should be established for
parties to protect their rights. Supervisory, regulatory and enforcement authorities
should have the authority, integrity and resources to fulfil their duties in a professional
and objective manner. However, where institutional resources are constrained, the
legal and regulatory requirements could be adjusted. For example, where courts
are weak more reliance might have to be placed on other mechanisms to protect
shareholder rights such as low shareholding thresholds for calling meetings and
proposing board members or high voting thresholds for major decisions. Rulings
should be timely, transparent and fully explained. Box 2 discusses in detail how the
OECD helps governments to improve corporate governance.192
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Box 2. OECD activities to improve corporate governance
Through its Steering Group on Corporate Governance and the Regional
Corporate Governance Roundtables, the OECD serves as the international
nexus for policy discussions in corporate governance. The Principles are the
centrepiece of the numerous activities undertaken by the OECD to improve
corporate governance. In co-operation with the World Bank, the OECD Re-
gional Roundtables have used the Principles as a framework for policy dialo-
gue to promote regional corporate governance reforms in Asia, Latin America,
Eurasia, Southeast Europe and Russia. This activity has resulted in regional
White Papers, which develop common policy objectives and highlight
recommendations for policy action. The knowledge gained from the Roundtables
has been made available to the public and is summarised in a recent OECD
report, Experiences from the Regional Corporate Governance Roundtables,
which compares the corporate governance problems faced by widely different
emerging market and developing economies and elaborates on the priorities
which these regions have established. This experience was in turn influential in
the review of the Principles.
Good corporate governance is also necessary for state-owned companies. The
ownership function of the state in companies where it is a shareholder has yet
to be fully resolved, even after taking into account the beneficial effects of
partial privatisation, which in many countries has opened the way to
unprecedented restructuring initiatives and increased exposure to competition
from private entities. The OECD Working Group on Privatisation and Corporate
Governance of State-Owned Enterprises is developing a set of Guidelines that,
once completed in 2005, should allow countries to better benchmark the
ownership functions of the state. This work is subject to an open consultation
process.
Regulatory reform is often associated with changes in the corporate governance
framework.  The OECD’s response to the growing demand for up-to-date,
comprehensive and comparable information about recent regulatory
developments has been to develop the Company Law and Corporate
Governance Database, a unique interactive tool for the dissemination of
corporate governance legal and regulatory information. Presently available to
only OECD governments, it will be made accessible to the general public via
the Internet before the end of 2004.The OECD Principles of Corporate Governance
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How was the review of the Principles  carried out?
OECD Ministers in 2002 called for an assessment of the OECD Principles by
2004, a year earlier than previously intended, in the wake of a series of corporate
scandals that had undermined confidence in the integrity of corporations, financial
institutions and markets. To support this work, the Ministers requested a survey of
corporate governance developments in OECD countries with a view to identifying
lessons to be learned and possible implications for the Principles.
The assessment was carried out under the responsibility of the OECD Steering
Group on Corporate Governance with the active participation of observers from
key international institutions, notably the Bank for International Settlement,
International Monetary Fund, World Bank, Financial Stability Forum, International
Organisation of Securities Commissions and the Basel Committee. Leading bu-
siness and labour representatives, notably the Business and Industry Advisory
Committee to the OECD and the Trade Union Advisory Committee to the OECD
also participated in the Steering Group’s meetings on an ad hoc basis.
The Steering Group sent a questionnaire to member countries requesting
information about corporate governance issues, the forces at work and proposed
policy measures. The responses, together with a review of practices in OECD
member countries formed the basis of a report entitled Corporate Governance:
A Survey of Developments in OECD Countries and informed the discussions
of the Steering Group.
In undertaking its review, the Steering Group organised comprehensive and
transparent consultations. The assessment process included extensive consulta-
tions with the private sector, labour and civil society at large. Three major
consultative meetings with broad participation were held in conjunction with the
Steering Group meetings. In addition, the OECD Secretary General convened two
informal roundtable meetings with senior representatives from key international
organisations, business and labour.
Consultations with non-member partners were first undertaken through meetings
of the five Regional Corporate Governance Roundtables. Additional input was
obtained from a special meeting attended by 43 non-member countries organised
in co-operation with the Global Corporate Governance Forum.194
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What happens next?
The Principles should be considered a living document. It is an OECD priority to
make sure that they are widely disseminated and actively used. This will include a
continuing policy-dialogue where policymakers, regulators and standard-setters will
be able to exchange practical experience of implementing the Principles.  The
OECD will also continue to monitor developments and identify new trends and
challenges that deserve attention. As an important part of future work, the OECD
will host an international multi-stakeholder dialogue on corporate governance. This
dialogue among corporations, investors, service providers, labour and others will
be as inclusive as possible and provide an important opportunity to ensure that the
Principles remain relevant and are actively  used   in  the   private  sector.   Beyond
the  Principles, once the Guidelines for Corporate Governance of State-Owned
Enterprises are agreed they will also become an aspect of the dialogue.
As for non-OECD countries, the next stage of the Regional Roundtable process is
already underway. In the case of the Russian Roundtable, the participants have
agreed to create two ad hoc Task Forces to examine policy options in two priority
areas: the transition towards internationally recognised financial reporting standards,
and problems arising from related-party transactions, transparency of beneficial
ownership and control. The Asian, Latin American and Southeast Europe
Roundtables will also focus on implementation and enforcement of White Paper
recommendations. The Eurasian Roundtable will shortly issue a Comparative
Overview of corporate governance in the region, containing priorities for further
action to be pursued in the follow-up phase. In January 2004 a draft of the revised
Principles  was posted on the Internet for comments from the general public.
Some 75 submissions were received from private individuals, professional
associations, business and trade unions and, where permission was given, they
were posted on the OECD website for public access.